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Your logins, on the machine your agent runs on.

Agent Pantry copies the sessions and secrets you allow from your daily driver to the agent host, sealed in transit.

Daily driver: test Firefox profile and secrets folder
cookies.sqlite.github.com           user_session.github.com           logged_inapp.example.com       sessionbank.example.net      sid.tracker.example.org  _gasecrets/GH_TOKENOPENAI_API_KEY
agentpantry source -once AES-256-GCM
Agent host: what the sink holds
$ agentpantry inventorycookies:  3 (3 persistent, 0 session)hosts:    2      2  .github.com      1  app.example.comnear-expiry (within 14d):  2026-11-24  session @ app.example.com $ ls ~/.config/agentpantry/secretsGH_TOKEN

The source config allowed github.com and .example.com, and the secret name GH_TOKEN. The struck lines never left the daily driver.

Runs on its own.

Once both ends run, syncs, receipts and health checks need no one.

  • BrigadeStack checks the sink

    brigadestack pantry status runs agentpantry doctor and reports role, peer, surfaces and every check. It is advisory and never fails a workspace doctor run.

  • Expiring sessions get flagged

    brigadestack pantry expiry-alert lists cookies close to expiry. With --send it posts the alert through Agent Notify.

  • Every apply leaves a receipt

    With [receipts] on, each send and apply appends a hash-chained line with counts and a digest, never values. receipts verify walks the chain.

  • Lands in files your tools already read

    The sink writes a SQLite sidecar, one file per secret, and adapters such as curl cookies.txt, Playwright storageState, GitHub CLI and OpenClaw. All of it is mode 0600.

Still manual: you create the key with keygen or pair and copy it to the source, write each side's config and domain list, and start source and sink yourself or with install-service. BrigadeStack prints those steps but never generates keys, starts services or edits auth files. brigadestack pantry sits on the extras surface, so run brigadestack extras on once.

Check it before you trust it.

Four things to try first. Each one is a real command with its real output.

Doctor

“Is the sink set up safely?”

doctor checks the key file, the bind address and every surface. A sink bound wider than loopback gets a warning unless a Tailscale identity gate is set.

agentpantry doctor[OK  ] key: private, 32 bytes[OK  ] config: sink 127.0.0.1:18787[OK  ] bind: loopback[OK  ] surface:sidecar: plaintext sidecar[OK  ] surface:secrets: ~/.config/agentpantry/secrets[OK  ] adapter:netscape: ~/.config/agentpantry/cookies.txt[OK  ] receipts: ~/.config/agentpantry/receipts.jsonl
Result 7 checks, 0 warnings

Dry run

“What would the source read and send?”

source -dry-run works from the config and file metadata. It does not load the key, read a cookie or contact the sink.

agentpantry source -dry-runsource plan (dry run): config and file metadata only; no values read, nothing dialed or writtenroute: tcp, peer 127.0.0.1:18787: dial the peer over TCP, receive the sink's session salt, push sealed frameskey: ~/.config/agentpantry/psk.key (present, mode 0600; contents not read)...  allow: github.com, .example.com...  allow: GH_TOKEN...  config_readiness: ready  website_authentication: not_verified
Result 0 values read, 0 connections made

Secrets

“Which secrets does a command get?”

run puts the synced secrets into one child process's environment and writes no staging file. Names outside [secret_names] never arrive.

agentpantry run -dry-run -- envGH_TOKENagentpantry run -- sh -c 'echo "GH_TOKEN: ${#GH_TOKEN} chars"; echo "OPENAI_API_KEY: ${OPENAI_API_KEY:-unset}"'GH_TOKEN: 19 charsOPENAI_API_KEY: unset
Result 1 of 2 source secrets reached the process

Wrong key

“What if another machine tries to push?”

A second source with its own keygen key pushed to the same sink. The sink dropped the connection and changed nothing. That source still exits 0, so read the sink log or receipts to see it.

agentpantry sinksink: listening on 127.0.0.1:18787, surfaces [sidecar secrets]connection ended: cipher: message authentication failedagentpantry receipts verifyok: 1 receipt(s), chain intact
Result 0 frames applied, still 3 cookies

What can touch your sessions.

Every path that reads or writes a value, and what limits it.

From the Agent Pantry 0.8.0 README
PathReads valuesWrites valuesLimited by
Source read: browser stores Yes A private temp copy, removed after domains.allow and domains.deny
Source read: secrets folder, KeePass Yes No [secret_names], KeePass tag opt-in
Wire: TCP or SSH stdio Sealed only Sealed only Pre-shared key, per-connection key, strict counter
Sink sidecar By inventory, restore, browser Yes, plaintext Mode 0600, sink binds loopback by default
Sink secrets and adapters Secrets by run Yes Mode 0600; gh and openclaw merge only
run Synced secrets Child environment only Deny-wins names, loader variables refused
Receipts No Counts and digests HMAC chain, mode 0600

The sidecar is plaintext on purpose so tools can read it. Treat the agent host like a secret store: anyone who can read that file can use the sessions in it.

Where it fits.

It moves state you already have between machines you control.

Copying cookie files by hand
Breaks when a session refreshes, and the copies end up in shell history, dotfiles and git.
A password manager
Agent Pantry does not store or generate passwords or hand out credentials on request. It mirrors sessions and named secrets you already have.
A hosted sync service
There is no server in the middle. The source dials your sink directly over a LAN, Tailscale or an SSH tunnel.
Cookie counts as proof
A cookie count cannot show a login still works. verify opens one tab in a signed-in browser lane and reports ok, challenge, empty or off_domain.

Command reference.

agentpantry

init -role source|sink
Write a commented starter config. Refuses to overwrite without --force.
keygen / pair
Create the 32-byte pre-shared key, or derive it from a one-time SPAKE2 code.
rotate-key
Rotate the key in place. The sink accepts both until -finish.
source / sink
Run each end. source -once syncs once; -stdio pipes frames over SSH.
doctor / status
Validate config, key and surfaces, or print role, peer and last sync. No values.
inventory
Summarize a sidecar by host, with near-expiry cookies.
verify
Check that a running browser lane is still signed in for one domain.
restore / browser
Write cookies into one target, or launch a signed-in automation Chrome.
run -- <command>
Inject synced secrets into one process's environment.
receipts show|verify
Read or verify the hash-chained receipt log.
install-service
Install a systemd user unit, or print a Windows task command.

brigadestack pantry

status
Role, peer, surfaces and every agentpantry doctor check. Advisory.
doctor
The same checks. Exits 1 when setup is unhealthy or incomplete, or agentpantry reports a failure.
expiry-alert
List near-expiry cookies. --send posts through Agent Notify.
setup plan --role source|sink
Print the init, key, doctor and run steps for one end. Writes nothing.
service plan
Print the service install steps. Starts nothing.